Counterfactual: What If The UK Had Not Gone to War in Iraq in 2003?
Tony McNulty speculates in an extract from the new book PRIME MINISTER BORIS & OTHER THINGS THAT NEVER HAPPENED.
23 Oct 2011, 18:16
What if Blair hadn't gone to war?
As a successful G20 meeting drew to a close in London on 2 April 2009, Gordon Brown reflected on his last six years as Prime Minister. He would stay as PM for a further year to ensure that the economic recovery took hold, and would then take up the international financial role that beckoned.
He had enjoyed the roller-coaster ride of the last six years, but he was ready for a change. His mind drifted back to the events concerning Iraq and Saddam Hussein that had brought him to the job of Prime Minister.
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‘When Blair assessed the balance of opinion within the Cabinet, he reckoned that without a second resolution he could only “just about get to a majority”.’1 It was to Blair’s great credit that a first United Nations resolution on Iraq had been secured in December 2002. Even Syria supported UN Security Council Resolution 1441, and it felt like a real triumph. The international community knew that the US did not feel governed by the UN and would attack Iraq without blinking if it felt it was within its interests. It was the work of the UK that led to the first resolution and it was Blair himself who had seen the importance of international consensus. However, this looked and felt like a mighty triumph for all of five minutes.2
Part of the problem was that 1441 seemed to mean all things to all people. Even worse, Blair’s overwhelming problem was that whatever view people had of the resolution, the very success of achieving it defined the problem as international and put the UN at the centre of any solution. In other words, securing the first resolution meant that a second resolution became essential, not optional.
Despite the constant rewriting of history since, most MPs were clear in 2002 that there might have to be military action against Iraq. The dominant tone of the debate was over the legitimacy of such action under the auspices of the UN and the need for a second resolution. It was about the balance between the need for action and the need to give the inspectors more time for Saddam to comply. The purist anti-war position was articulated by very few MPs. Even the Liberal Democrat front bench was clear that its concerns were around the authority for military action, not the principle of action itself. There was a considerable degree of support for Blair’s approach from Labour MPs, and he could be assured of their backing as long as the second resolution route was in play. Blair’s concerns about support within the cabinet without a second resolution, however, were very real and even more apparent in the ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party.
As the year turned to 2003, it was unclear exactly what was going on. For many, the search for a second resolution was in full swing and the whole issue of any military action would only be taken forward within the context of the UN. For them the debate over the role of the UN had been won – no second resolution, no war. For others, the UN was seen as totally irrelevant, a second resolution mere window-dressing, and the momentum behind military action unstoppable.
In February 2003, President Chirac of France made clear to Blair at a meeting in Le Touqet that war in Iraq was not something that the French were likely to support. Although the public face of Le Touqet was unity and deep discussion, the private meetings did not augur well for Blair in his search for a second resolution. Chirac seemed keen to lead an anti-American bloc internationally and Blair left France with growing anxiety, deeply frustrated with the French attitude.
The quest for a second resolution seemed to be increasingly fruitless, and pressure was mounting on Blair to explain where his government would go if there was no such. Blair had hoped that the momentum created by the first resolution would grow behind the second – but all the signs pointed the other way, and it became increasingly clear that Blair possessed no safety blanket. The US had made clear that it did not see the need for a second resolution, though Colin Powell had failed to shift the sentiments of the Security Council to the US view in early February. Many MPs appreciated that the UN route was still open only because of Blair’s efforts. But just as the second resolution became all the more unlikely, it became all the more important in political terms. Blair needed it to gain the support of his party for action.
Disquiet on the government back benches continued to build. Without a second resolution, there was likely to be a majority of backbenchers against any military action. The key question for Blair was where the payroll vote would lie. How many of his colleagues in cabinet, and in the wider government, needed the second resolution to support action? Robin Cook had made noises in this direction. Publicly there was little disquiet or discussion, but within government, Cook was vociferous about the need for a second resolution even as Blair and Straw were clear that they had to stick with the Americans. There had been some discussion about a Straw-inspired alternative that would have meant that the UK did not go to war but effectively led the international effort for reconstruction and development under the auspices of the UN. This plan got short shrift from Blair, who was more and more certain that he now had to go all the way with Bush to war, regardless of the fate of a second resolution. As a loyal Foreign Secretary, Straw began to see that he had to go with Blair regardless of the outcome.
Throughout the early days of February, the march to war seemed inevitable; the only real issue was who in Blair’s cabinet would support him and the US. Brown had made clear that he fully endorsed the path the government had taken to date.3 He had seen the intelligence and understood the threat that Saddam posed – but he was also clear that the second resolution was crucial and that it was difficult to see how the government could support the Americans without it. He was appalled by what was now emerging as the public hand-wringing of Cook, Short and Denham, viewing it as indulgent and deeply disloyal. Everyone had serious doubts, but most resisted the luxury of such self-indulgence.
Like others, Brown supported the notion that the House of Commons should have a vote if the UK were to participate in any military action, and he wanted to ensure that the government was well-placed to assist in any post-war reconstruction, regardless of whether or not the UK was actually involved in the war.
On 5 March 2003 Germany and France joined Russia in making clear that they would not support any second resolution that endorsed the use of force. The following Security Council meeting on 7 March was deadlocked. The US and UK were not going to table a second resolution unless they could secure the necessary votes for it to pass – which seemed unlikely. The only certainty was that they were now in the end game; the ongoing fudge of supporting the Americans and also the need for a second resolution could no longer be sustained.
The debate within government was intense, but most cabinet members were clear that it should remain internal, in line with collective responsibility. Not even Brown flinched when Clare Short was summarily dismissed for going on Radio 4’s Westminster Hour and calling Blair’s behaviour ‘reckless’. Whatever views cabinet members had on the impending military action, all knew that Short’s behaviour warranted dismissal. Brown was very clear that a second resolution was essential, but he was not going to rush to support Short and felt that her actions undermined the serious debate that was raging across government.
Blair knew that time was running out on a second resolution. The moment was fast approaching when his twin-track strategy would reach its natural end and the government would have to go one way or the other – alone with the Americans, or together with those who opposed military action without a second resolution. The Americans began to understand the importance of the second resolution for Blair, but were clear that if he felt the UK and his government would be damaged by supporting action, then they would go it alone. Blair thought right to the end that he would get the second resolution; unlike others, however, he was always clear that he would support the Americans regardless, and he knew the dangers. Others weren’t so sure. Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff, has said: ‘When we couldn’t get the second resolution, Tony thought, we all thought: “Oh fuck, what are we going to do now?”4 But Blair knew what he was going to do.
Things now moved apace. Within twenty-four hours of Short’s sacking, Chirac finally shut off the option of a second resolution when he announced that ‘France will vote “non” because we believe, tonight, that there are no grounds to wage war.’5 The only path remaining was to go back to resolution 1441, an argument that many felt had already been lost. Brown made it very clear that this was the end of the road and that the UK could not support unilateral action by the US. Despite his strong ties to America and his avowed Atlanticism, this was a step too far. He told Blair that the government could not support the Americans and that the issue now was how they would jointly decouple the UK from the US on military action and focus instead on how they could help Iraq in a post-conflict situation. Brown assured Blair that he would defend him against any flak over the decision not to support the Americans.
But Blair himself was clear that he could not live with a course of action that walked away from the Americans. He still wanted to support them and he believed personally that resolution 1441 contained all the relevant justifications for action. He wanted to discuss how Brown and the others could help to persuade the party, the backbenchers and the country that we should still support the US. But Brown bluntly told Blair that over half of the cabinet would not support such a course of action. He told him also that the backbenchers knew that disquiet in the cabinet had grown and rebel numbers had risen as a consequence; at the end of February, 122 Labour MPs had voted for an amendment that ‘the case for war had not yet been made’, and estimates in early March suggested the numbers could be well over 200, after it became clear that no second resolution was forthcoming.
Brown had thought that Blair would accept the reality of the situation and tell the Americans that British support was off – after all, Bush would understand the difficulties. But Blair was adamant; if he could not get the government, Parliament and the country to support the American action against Iraq, then he could not, with any integrity, continue as Prime Minister. When he had told his staff that he was serious about supporting the Americans and that this could be the end for him, he meant it. Brown made clear, however, that if the proposal to support American military action was put to the House as had been promised, then the government itself could be at risk, as half the cabinet and over 200 backbenchers would not support any motion that endorsed the use of force. It was as stark as that. ‘If I can’t raise support for a cause I believe to be so right, then I have no choice but to go’, said Blair. ‘It’s that simple.’
As the American march to military action continued unabated, the Prime Minister became more and more isolated. The view of the UK government had changed from broad support to the Americans to backing for those who demanded more time for the arms inspectors and no support for military action. Gambling that an all-out personal appeal would shift his cabinet, Blair called a meeting for Sunday 16 March.
He argued passionately for his position. First, he told the cabinet that military action was imminent and that there was no chance at all of any second resolution or support for such action from the UN. Second, he made clear that he would continue to support the Americans, and if this position did not command the support of the majority around the cabinet table he would resign as Prime Minister as a matter of principle. It became clear, however, that he had miscalculated; his threat was not enough to shift his colleagues’ views, which now mirrored those of the PLP.
Blair had to go. His resignation was immediately followed by that of John Prescott, declaring that as he was elected Deputy Leader alongside Tony Blair, loyalty told him they came as a pair, and if Blair was going, then so was he. The cabinet unanimously endorsed a proposal that Brown become PM pro tem until the party could elect a new leader. With that, the dramatic cabinet meeting ended, only to be resumed the next day. Blair agreed that he would make a statement only after the government had made its new position clear.
When the cabinet reconvened the next day, Straw and Hoon, key proponents of the previous strategy, had gone too. Brown would deal with the reshuffle in time; the key business now was to determine how to go forward. In the normal course of events, Cook, as Leader of the House, would need to make a statement changing the business of the House to drop the debate on military action in Iraq. It was very clear that Brown would have to make a broader statement first, explaining the change in Prime Minister, why the government was no longer supporting the Americans and what the government would now seek to do instead.
Brown was clear that he did not want the decision to be seen as anti-American. The government did not share the visceral – and, Brown thought, juvenile – anti-Americanism of some on the left and some of their European counterparts. The government was not anti-war or anti-military action – this was about the legitimacy of action now, and the role of the UN. The government could not wash it hands of the consequences of American action and would need to decide what international role it would seek to play in the area.
Brown told the Commons that the Labour Party would select a new leader in due course, that he would act as Prime Minister in the interim, as elected by the cabinet, and that the first item of business would be dealing with the international fallout of any military action against Iraq by the US. He emphasised that the UK remained the US’s strongest ally and that his government would work closely with the UN to deal with the consequences of any military action. Brown made clear to the Commons that walking off the international stage was not an option and that he would seek to ensure that the UK led the internationally sanctioned reconstruction of Iraq, continuing to work with the US and others to ensure the development and reinvigoration of the Middle East peace process.
The world watched as, throughout the next evening, US bombers flew sorties over Iraq, delivering the ‘shock and awe’ that Bush had promised. Some six weeks later, Bush declared ‘mission accomplished’ as Saddam’s regime crumbled and the initial phase of the action was over.
The UK led the international efforts through the UN to ensure the reconstruction of Iraq. As the US still regarded the UK as a key ally, Britain acted as a conduit for them at the UN. Some in Washington, particularly Rice and Powell, were hugely disappointed that the US had found itself alone when war broke out. They knew that Bush had gone too soon, and also that this could still prove to be a disaster, notwithstanding the early military success. Ironically, it seemed that the UK was now in a more powerful position to influence the Americans because it had not supported the initial action.
Crucially, Rice and Powell were successful in ensuring that a fully resourced team in the US Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA) was established and worked with international experts in the UN and the UK. They also ensured that good early decisions were made about reconstruction; they resisted neo-conservative notions of a complete so-called ‘de-Ba’athification’ of Iraq. Such a policy would have instantly dismissed most of the key middle-ranking administrators, police and army, where membership of the Ba’ath Party was more or less compulsory.
By the end of May, the UK proved successful in securing a unanimous vote on resolution 1483, effectively giving the UN an increasing role in post-war Iraq. This mattered because, with the key middle strata of the army, police and civil service still in place due to the efforts of Rice and Powell, the UN had the people to work with to counter any growing anti-US insurgency that might spring up. Had the neo-cons had their way, some 250,000 army, police and civil servants would be on the streets of Iraq, ripe for recruitment to an insurgency. Rice and Powell would freely admit later that they were only able to get their way on reconstruction in the face of the strength of the neo-cons because the UK had not supported the military action.
There was, accordingly, no fully blown insurgency in Iraq, though the violence did continue for some time. The UN took over more and more responsibility for the reconstruction, and Iraq proved to be far from the disaster that many had predicted. In the US, although not as bad, violent or costly in terms of lives as many had expected, the war soon became very unpopular, and the exposure of what was seen as an increasingly bizarre neo-con view of the world strengthened the hand of Powell and Rice. Their success in working with the UK and the UN over the reconstruction of Iraq also increased their popularity and political currency in the US and abroad.
The UK came out of the conflict in a strong position. Brown attempted to use his leverage to get the Middle East peace process back on track. There had been discussions before the war over a new roadmap for peace, but many felt that this was just Bush trying to build alliances, and he was not really serious about the peace process itself. The UK would play a leading role in developing a new way forward for peace in the Middle East, as well as in the reconstruction of Iraq.
As the international community started to get a grip on the rebuilding of Iraq, both the US and UK turned their attention to internal matters. Domestic American politics saw intense criticism of Bush, fuelled by the view that if he could not even maintain the support of the UK, then he had failed in a spectacular fashion. Powell and Rice were very keen to make sure that the American public knew about the options put forward by Bush’s neo-conservative colleagues, and just how disastrous they would have been for the military and the American body count. It would be interesting to see how Bush fared when he ran for re-election in 2004.
In the UK a timetable was drawn up for the Labour leadership election, culminating with the result of the contest being announced at the Labour conference in Bournemouth in September. When nominations closed in mid-June, it was clear that Brown was the overwhelming favourite, facing a two-pronged attack from Alan Milburn as the ‘Blairite’ candidate and Clare Short as the weakly endorsed ultra-left candidate. The party agreed to scrap the largely irrelevant position of deputy leader, so there was no contest to replace Prescott.
Brown won the election handsomely, with Milburn in a strong second place and Short a very poor third. The result was announced on the Sunday of the conference, and Brown made a unifying speech in the regular Tuesday afternoon slot that followed. The whole week, though, was distracted by speculation over a general election. Although the government had only been in power for two years, many felt that the new leader should seek his own mandate from the electorate, and the entire coverage of the conference from the time that Brown sat down after his speech was all about its likely date. Labour was still riding high in the polls, sustaining a 7–10 per cent lead over the Tories since Blair’s resignation, and more like 10 per cent plus in the first polls after Brown’s conference speech.
On the Thursday lunchtime, as the conference was winding down, Brown made an impromptu speech, short and sharp. He said that he had been persuaded by those who had argued that any new leader who was also Prime Minister should seek their own mandate at the earliest opportunity. The country needed direction and he needed the certainty of his own endorsement. There would be an election at the earliest opportunity; he would be going to the Palace as soon as he returned to London.
Neither Charles Kennedy nor Iain Duncan Smith, the leaders of the Liberal Democrats and the Tories respectively, could object to the announcement, as both had complained about Brown’s apparent lack of a mandate. In truth, however, the Tories had not got over the 2001 defeat – virtually a repeat of the 1997 landslide – and the Liberal Democrats needed more time to consolidate their 2001 position. It was not to be.
In a largely uneventful election, it soon became clear that people were happy to confirm the change in Labour leadership, were fairly indifferent about the rather lacklustre efforts of the Liberal Democrats and gave some, though little, reward to Duncan Smith’s Tories. Labour lost twenty seats – all to the Tories, who also gained two seats from the Liberal Democrats. So Labour emerged with 393, the Tories 188, the Liberal Democrats 50 and others 28 – with the Speaker, who was Labour, this gave an overall Labour majority of 126.
The new cabinet was a prudent mix of those who could be described as Blairite and Brownite. Brown confirmed most of his changes earlier in May when he had restored Cook as Foreign Secretary, Darling had become Chancellor, Blunkett stayed at the Home Office and Prescott at the ODPM, now renamed as the Communities and Local Government Department. There were no comebacks for Straw or Hoon, and many changes in the lower ministerial ranks. Brown’s hand was strengthened as two of his key lieutenants, Ed Balls and Ed Miliband, were elected as MPs; it was felt that neither would have to wait long before securing preferment.
Within the Conservative Party there had been rumblings against Iain Duncan Smith even before the election, and many felt that he would have done well to survive the conference season. Although the Tories had gained twenty-two seats the election was still seen as a major disappointment. The Labour Party had effectively won a third landslide, the Tory vote had remained more or less static and the party had still won fewer than 200 seats. Duncan Smith accordingly resigned. Michael Howard was persuaded to step into the breach and was elected unopposed, declaring that the party needed stability and that he would seek to lead the party up to the next election and beyond.
Charles Kennedy’s leadership of the Liberal Democrats was also called into question as his party had performed indifferently in the election – but he held on as there was no pressing contender and most of the party membership still supported him. There were some noises off from pushy, disgruntled MEPs led by an unknown named Nick Clegg, but most understood that Kennedy’s personal appeal had prevented a worse result than had actually transpired.
So, as the country headed into 2004, the settled view was that the government had done well on foreign affairs, especially in the two areas of the reconstruction of Iraq under the auspices of the UN and the increasing possibility of progress in the Middle East peace process. The UK had decided to bid for the 2012 Olympics and, given the UK’s high regard internationally, had some confidence of success.
Domestically, the cabinet was united around a public services reform agenda. Investment in all the key services remained high, but it had come on the back of deals done between Brown and Darling over reform. There was agreement on the need for transformation in all areas; Brown endorsed foundation hospitals and trusts in the NHS, greater local involvement in the health service and a reinforcement of the rewards and targets system. He was keen to work with John Reid to ensure that the government gained a good return from the huge sums that were being invested in the NHS.
Education was also a key issue, one that played to all that New Labour stood for on social mobility, aspiration and advance. Brown knew and understood the power of education. He could never understand why the English state system had fallen so far behind its Scottish counterpart, and worked closely with Education Secretary, Charles Clarke, to improve performance in return for investment. One key area of reform was in higher education, where they worked closely together to see the introduction of a mixed system of fees, of no more than £3,000, and a graduate tax, both payable by those earning over £22,000. This hybrid system meant that the future of funding for universities was secured and top-up fees were outlawed, as had been pledged in the Labour manifesto.
Policing and security had been a key issue for the government since the events of 9/11. Brown knew that the threat from al-Qaeda had been very real before 2001, and it remained so despite the advances in Iraq and the Middle East. On 11 March 2004 a series of bombs on the Cercanias commuter train system in Madrid killed 191 and injured over 1,800. In the same month a number of arrests were made throughout the south of England; an al-Qaeda-inspired group of extremists was planning to plant bombs in the Ministry of Sound nightclub in London, Bluewater Shopping Centre and London synagogues. In August Dhiren Barot and others were arrested as part of a ‘dirty bomb’ plot.
The government was keenly aware of the balance between security and civil liberties and the way in which the terrorists played on this balance, hoping governments would exaggerate their response. It was also clear that unscrupulous politicians, particularly the Liberal Democrats, would seek to exploit any problems for the government. Recognising the need to strike the right balance, Brown was nevertheless clear that security was paramount. This approach survived the resignation of David Blunkett in December 2004; Blunkett was replaced by Charles Clarke, despite Clarke’s rather fractious (at best) relationship with Brown.
In the US, during 2004, John Kerry emerged as the strongest rival to Al Gore during the primaries for the Democratic nomination for the presidency. Gore had not intended to run for a second time against Bush, but felt that the way in which the President had abused his tenuous mandate over Iraq left him no choice. If it hadn’t been for the UK, the US would be totally isolated and in dangerous territory. Gore felt that he owed it to the nation to try to repeat the contest of 2000. He duly won the nomination, selected Kerry as his vice-presidential running mate, and won the general election in November, crucially taking Ohio and, unlike 2000, his home state of Tennessee.
At home, the fate of the Tories went from bad to worse. Michael Howard faced difficulties in trying to modernise the party while at the same bringing its traditional base with him. In the June 2004 European elections, the Tories came third, behind the UK Independence Party. Howard was keen to keep his initial promise to stay as leader for the entire Parliament, but was constantly forced to reflect on his position. It seemed as though events conspired against him, as the Tories continued to flatline or worse in the polls. After another bad set of results in the local elections in 2005, he subsequently announced that he would resign – and the search for a new leader by the party conference in October began. The main contenders soon emerged as Ken Clarke, David Davis, Michael Portillo and Liam Fox – with a potential bid from either George Osborne or David Cameron.
In an extraordinarily eventful month, London was announced as the venue for the 2012 Olympics on 6 July, and the London bombs rocked the country on the 7th. Brown was up at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles when the news came through and insisted on flying back to London to take control. In all, 52 people were murdered on London’s tube and bus network, with over 700 injured. Despite the positive endeavours of the UK government in Iraq and the wider Middle East, the violent extremists continued their activities – including, of course, the murder of many Muslims.
Brown was clear once more that while there had to be a balance between the struggle against terrorism and civil liberties, a government’s first duty was to the safety of the public. His speech in Dunfermline that weekend – subsequently known as the Dunfermline declaration – made clear that he would not side with those who thought the attacks meant that the ‘rules of the game had changed’, but neither would he join with those who put the human rights and civil liberties of those who would kill above public safety. He demanded that Parliament work with him to secure the security of the nation and told the opposition parties that the country would not forgive them if they played party politics in the wake of the threat.
As Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook had worked with relish on both the development of the Middle East peace process and the reconstruction of Iraq. The bombings of 7/7, however, posed a further huge challenge, as the government prepared for the recall of Parliament in September to discuss its response. Cook took the opportunity for a brief holiday in the Highlands, and died suddenly while out walking near the summit of Ben Stack on 6 August. Brown was quick to make David Miliband the new Foreign Secretary in a bid to finally heal any remaining scars between the competing Labour tribes. Miliband made clear that he would take forward Cook’s attempts to develop the UK’s foreign policy in an ethical way, while resisting empty gestures.
After witnessing a successful Labour conference in Brighton, with a strong and united Labour Party, the Tories headed to Blackpool with a modicum of trepidation – five declared candidates would present their case for being leader. Although it would be the job of the MPs to whittle the field of five down to two before the party membership voted, everybody agreed that the candidates’ presentations at the conference would be crucial for their prospects in the MPs’ ballots. Going into the conference, David Davis and Ken Clarke were the frontrunners. It was felt that it was too late for Portillo, Fox was a darling of the right wing but with limited public appeal, and that the youthful and inexperienced Cameron was simply putting down a marker for the future. The speeches broadly endorsed these views. Whilst Davis’ speech had been weak, he was still viewed as the only serious right-wing candidate. Portillo and Clarke both played to the modernising agenda, but Portillo seemed tired while Clarke was rejuvenated by the contest, emerging as the front runner after the conference. On a minor note, rather than put a marker down, Cameron was seen as having made a serious error with his speech. He wandered the stage with no notes, in a style that was judged both rambling and arrogant. There was muted applause when he finished and many old hands considered it a rude and juvenile performance that showed his misunderstanding of the party faithful.
In the end, Clarke and Davis went through to the run-off and Clarke emerged as leader by a whisker – by 102,671 to 96,173. He won, it was felt, because more party members were against Davis than were against Clarke. Both Hague and Duncan Smith had fought elections on the sort of right-wing agenda that Davis supported, and it had been decisively rejected by the country as recently as 2003.
Clarke’s first action was to make clear that he was not going to be a prisoner of the right simply because the election was so close. He asked Davis to be Shadow Foreign or Shadow Defence minister. but he was not going to give him a deputy role, Shadow Home Secretary or Shadow Chancellor.
Observers suggested that the election of Ken Clarke as the Tory leader saved Charles Kennedy’s leadership of the Liberal Democrats. There were strong rumours circulating about Liberal Democrat MPs’ concern over Kennedy’s apparent problems with drink. They had planned to use the election of ‘new blood’ as Tory leader as the excuse to strike, but Clarke’s success meant that Kennedy’s leadership was safe for now. He was claiming to clear up his problem, and was given the benefit of the doubt.
Ken Clarke’s election did not mark an immediate turn of fortune for his party, but did herald a different form of politics – much to the annoyance of his right wing and some of the younger Tory MPs. When the Home Office discovered that the prison service and the immigration service had failed to deport a number of foreign prisoners on completion of their sentences, the tabloid press had a field day. The issue broke in the run-up to local elections in 2006; the perfect storm of elections, crime and foreigners proved irresistible to the ‘red tops’. It looked for a while as though the government, particularly Home Secretary Charles Clarke, was in trouble, but just as the issue was really heating up, Ken Clarke went on television to defuse the row. Making clear that he regarded the issue as very serious, he nevertheless argued that it was ‘not a matter of government policy but a matter of one part of the administration not talking to another part’, and that the government should simply get on and fix the problem. When pushed, he said that: ‘I have not come into politics to play silly games. The Home Secretary needs to get a grip, but, God knows, I’ve had my own experience of admin failure – get over it.’
Not only did this intervention save Charles Clarke’s job as Home Secretary, it also increased Ken Clarke’s national standing. He seemed to tap into a growing yearning from the public to have politicians who spoke normally and were not always looking for a chance to oppose for the sake of opposition. His natural inclination to ‘tell it as it is’ was reinforced by his confidence that the Tories could not afford to drop yet another leader. This approach meant that Brown could keep Charles Clarke in place to get on with solving the problem. Charles Kennedy could only agree with this approach; to do otherwise would seem to be partisan and churlish.
Charles Clarke accordingly got on with clearing up the mess, stayed on as Home Secretary and dealt with the ‘airline plot’ in the summer of 2006, when a group of terrorists sought to use ‘liquid bombs’ to down between three and seven transatlantic airliners.10 Co-operation between the UK, the US and Pakistan meant that the project was foiled, but it was another reminder of the existence of a very real threat. Charles Clarke had already worked well with the opposition and easily secured agreement to a pre-charge detention limit of up to 28 days in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2006. These powers were used for the first time in the ‘airline plot’ and the police did not need more time than this. Ken Clarke and Charles Kennedy both said that, within reason, they would do all that they could to maintain a political consensus on the response to terrorism.
Much of the government’s focus from 2007 onwards was on the growing difficulties in the economy. There were rumblings at the turn of the year about the next election. For most of the recent past, most governments had lasted for four years, only staying on for the full five-year term if there were problems, as with John Major in 1997. There was talk that Brown was going to go in 2007 rather than wait until 2008. Labour remained buoyant in the polls, although there were signs of a ‘Ken Clarke bounce’. Very unusually, however, Brown announced in March 2007 that as there was no compelling need to go to the country early, the Parliament would run its full five-year term, with the election scheduled for October 2008. Some had tried to depict Brown as a ditherer; the label did not stick after this announcement.
The remaining period before the election of 2008 was dominated by the economy and the emerging global recession. The collapse of Northern Rock was just the first manifestation of economic difficulties in the UK. In September 2007, the building society sought a liquidity support facility from the Bank of England following problems in the international credit markets due to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Eventually, Northern Rock was nationalised in February 2008, the first step in a series of decisive actions taken by Gordon Brown to insulate the economy from a run on the banks. Brown took the initiative both at home and abroad and won plaudits around the world for his actions and his international leadership.
Given that Ken Clarke had said only the previous year that the Tories would match government spending; and, furthermore, that he accepted that government spending was part of any recovery from recession, the Tories were fairly mute in response to the crisis. The Liberal Democrat claim that they had foreseen the impending economic crisis was met with derision and the party’s Shadow Chancellor, Vince Cable, was derided as a mix between Mystic Meg and Mr. Bean.
The Tories were all over the place in response to the economic crisis. Ken Clarke’s difficulty, as an ex-Chancellor, was that he did not trust anyone else on his front bench to lead on the economy. This attitude was hardened when a junior member of the shadow Treasury team, George Osborne, thought it would be a good idea to announce a Conservative pledge for a huge rise in the threshold for inheritance tax as a wheeze to scare Brown off any notion of an election in October 2007. This allowed Brown to announce that of course there would not be an election as his government was far too busy working in the national interest to turn the economy around. He was able to capitalise on Osborne’s policy by suggesting that the Tories were only interested in the very rich. Ken Clarke was absolutely furious and, unusually, made it known that, in his own words, he ‘gave this little boy a right bollocking’.
The world economy settled down, but even the strongest national economies were still shrinking. Brown felt it imperative for an international stimulus package to be developed, saving some of the smaller developed economies from potential collapse, though of course it was Germany and France that have to sort out any problems in the Euro-zone. Commentators couldn’t help but notice that it was Brown as Chancellor who had kept the UK out of the Euro – and a ‘bloody good job too!’ announced The Sun.
With an agreed plan for economic recovery in place and with accolades from the international community for his efforts during the world downturn, Brown headed for the 2008 election with a degree of optimism. It looked as though the country recognised that there was no alternative to Labour, that the Tories were still in disarray and the Liberal Democrats were out of their depth on most issues. The issue for Brown was how long he wanted to go on as Prime Minister. He had relished leading the response to the international crisis and steering the recovery. He had spent his entire career talking about the need for a new Bretton Woods, a new international financial architecture. There was real pressure from international colleagues for him to step up to the plate and give the world the systems it needed to resist or prevent further economic crises.
As he was driven to the Palace to submit his resignation to the Queen and seek the dissolution of Parliament and an election, his thoughts turned again to an international role. ‘London holds the G20 in April 2009 – I’ll decide by then. By that time there will be plenty of contenders to replace me – Clarke, Johnson, Balls, Ed or David Miliband, Burnham or Yvette – who knows?’
Notes
1 A. Rawnsley, The End of the Party (Penguin, 2010), p. 144.
2 Ibid., p. 140.
3 S. Richards, Whatever It Takes (Fourth Estate, 2010), p. 181.
4 Rawnsley, The End of the Party, p. 153.
5 Ibid., p. 160.
6 In October 2007, 21 people were found guilty on a range of charges from forgery to murder. No direct link to core al-Qaeda was ever established, but the attack was certainly al-Qaeda-inspired.
7 Operation Crevice, as it was called, successfully disrupted an attempt to cause mass murder through bombs planted in public places. Clear links were established back to al-Qaeda in Pakistan. In 2007 five of the defendants were found guilty.
8 Operation Rhyme, as it was called, was a plan to develop and use a dirty radiation device or dirty bomb. Again clear links were established with core al-Qaeda and all the principal defendants were found guilty in 2007.
9 David Blunkett resigned over personal matters in December 2004 following an inquiry into allegations that he had improperly used his position – for which there was no subsequent evidence.
10 Six men were found guilty on a range of charges in 2009 and 2010 relating to this plot. Again, there were clear links with core al-Qaeda in
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Counterfactual: What If This Site Didn't Ask Disgraced Labour Failures To Speculate On Stuff Upon Which Others Are Far More Qualified And Who - Incidentally - Haven't Got A Partisan, Self-Serving, Ass-Covering Axe To Grind?
First MacShane. Now McNulty. Who next? Woolas? Illsley? Hope? Moran? Byers? Hoon? Chater? Morley?
I enjoy counterfactual analysis. But please can we have Ferguson, Beevor, Roberts, Keegan, Brogan, Moore, Hitchens (P), Hitchens (C), Oborne, D'Ancona or Rawnsley instead?
04/11/2011 00:15