Reflections on 9/11 and its Aftermath
Tony McNulty, in a lengthy essay, describes the immediate reaction to the events of 9/11 and analyses the mistakes made afterwards.
10 Sep 2011, 18:30
Tony McNulty's 9/11 Memory
This is why I found myself on September 11th 2001 in the Lower Whips Office in the House of Commons. I was taking the opportunity to catch up with both whip and MP paperwork. As usual in the Whips Office, the TV was on and tuned to, I think, Sky News. We were waiting for the Prime Minister’s speech at the Trades Union Congress in Brighton. Relations between the government and the TUC were regrettably fractious at the time and we weren’t sure how hostile a response to his speech there would be. But, as history now knows, that speech was never made and after a very brief few words to the TUC, the PM raced back to London.
The first plane, American Airlines 11, went into the North Tower at 8.46am (New York time) and flight United Airlines 175 went into the South Tower at 9.03am. This all happened between 13.46 and 14.03 London time. I watched the first attack open-mouthed and worried about the consequences of what appeared to be an aviation accident of the most tragic kind. I had been in New York in 1998 and remembered clearly the dominant nature of the two towers of the World Trade Centre. I remember going up the North Tower to the Observation Deck – and looking in wonder at the spectacular views in every direction – way up north towards upper Manhattan and upstate New York, Brooklyn and Queens to the East, Jersey City to the west and long languid views across the water to the south.
The visual image of the first apparent crash was so compelling that, like people throughout the world at that time, I watched the TV screen transfixed and was able to see clearly the second plane hit the second tower. Straight away both my own perception of the event and the commentary on TV took a more sinister turn and I knew that this was an attack of some kind. The USA, the modern beacon of the free world, was under attack. This took time to digest, but even at such an early stage, thoughts turned to the sorts of revenge a neo-conservative President like Bush would exact. I continued to watch open-mouthed as the human tragedy unfolded, interspersed with reports about other hijacked planes, the threat to the White House, the whereabouts of the President and, in passing, whether we should worry about a threat to the UK and what would this mean for Parliament.
In a day that provided so many dramatic visual shocks, two images from this early stage of events have stayed with me. It is hard to remember quite when in the course of the day I first saw them, but they remain with me. The first, which I now know took place just after the second plane smashed into the South Tower, was the look of absolute horror on President Bush’s face as he was told of the unfolding events. He was at a school in Florida reading from ‘The Pet Goat’ to very young schoolchildren – a haunting visual. The second was equally compelling. As the drama unfolded, there was a stream of what appeared to be falling debris from the top of the North Tower. Many commentators referred to this, as part of the general description of what was happening, and it only slowly dawned on all of us quite what we were watching and, as it did, it was mentioned less and less by the commentators. For, far from debris, what we were watching was the plight of desperate people who, having been trapped above the floors where the plane entered, saw no hope and leapt to their death. It was the most compelling human dimension to the day – a day that contained enough dramas to last a lifetime.
There was a real fear that this was not the end of the attack and, while the Federal Aviation Authority got a grip on airline traffic as best it could, there were strong rumours of other planes that had been hijacked. While everyone watching was focussed on the drama of the World Trade Centre, news came through that American Airlines 77 had been hijacked and was returning to the East Coast, apparently heading for Washington DC. At 9.37, New York time, 48 minutes after the first plane hit the North Tower, AA77 smashed into the Pentagon. Twenty-six minutes later the passengers of United Airlines 93 overpowered the hijackers and crashed the plane into the woods near Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10.03 New York time. In between these two horrific events, the world witnessed the astonishing collapse of the South Tower of the World Trade Centre. It started at about 10.00 and just dropped like a stone – more compelling visual drama that you wanted to turn away from, as it seemed so intrusive, but couldn’t do so. The North Tower collapsed about half an hour later in just as dramatic a fashion and, in Manhattan, the drama shifted to the street and how the people of New York dealt with evacuating Lower Manhattan, with mass smoke clouds and generally coped with the ensuing mayhem and chaos.
By the time all this horror and carnage was over nearly 3,000 died in the attacks. For once, the rolling news stations did not have to invent drama or fill airtime with inane conversations with each other about what might happen next. This horrible drama was unfolding before their very eyes and all of them covered events in an excellent manner. Not surprisingly, in the first instance, we watched the story unfold on the American networks – CNN especially as it was available – but eventually the BBC and Sky caught up with events, both in New York and throughout the USA.
The more we watched the events unfold, the more we got lost in the coverage and felt closer to events than we obviously were. This was partly because of the compelling nature of the drama and partly because it was happening in such familiar territory. Almost all of the cityscapes and scenery of New York City are iconic or at least familiar to people the world over. People who had only ever dreamed of going to New York felt that they knew her streets and avenues intimately.
Sometime just before 10.00, a CNN correspondent mentioned Osama Bin Laden as someone who was determined to attack the USA. Most people watching would have never heard of him and would certainly never have heard of al-Qaeda. As the day developed, there was more and more discussion about the origins of the organisation or individuals that had planned and carried out these awful attacks. Slowly the focal point shifted from covering the events as they happened to trying to understand who might have carried out the attacks and why they happened. There was increasing discussion about Bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the fact that the Taliban in Afghanistan was providing safe haven for Bin Laden and his organisation. When discussing the way in which the USA might respond to these attacks, both Afghanistan and Iraq were frequently mentioned. Even at this early stage, there was real fear that Bush and his colleagues would lash out in many directions and take revenge rooted in their own prejudices rather than based on any evidence. We now know that Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld was very keen to find any possible evidence linking Iraq and Saddam Hussein to the attacks.
Three days after the attacks, the House of Commons met to discuss the events that had taken place. The House was in recess but had been recalled especially to discuss 9/11 and how Britain should respond. There is little for government whips to do in terms of the organisation of a recall – all the details are the responsibility of the House of Commons authority. We simply rang around to see if colleagues were available to attend. On a day such as the 14th September, there was unanimity across the House about the horror of the events of 9/11 and the role of the whips was very limited. Tony Blair made clear that we stood in solidarity with the USA, that the perpetrators should be brought to justice and that the world should rethink the way it dealt with terrorism. Other party leaders agreed, as did most of the contributors, and it was useful to have the Commons articulate what the nation was feeling. It was too early to focus on a detailed response, but it was clear that the UK would stand with the USA. When the USA subsequently attacked Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban government and Osama Bin Laden, the UK gave as much political and military support as it could – and now, in 2011, we are still there.
Ten years on, whilst it is hard to resist the benefits of hindsight, there are many issues that should have been treated differently. Although it was perhaps understandable in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 atrocity, the language employed by the Bush Administration was far from helpful. Language is not just about so-called ‘political correctness’, it is also about nuance, semiotics, meaning and code. The characterisation of subsequent events as a crusade was not helpful. The use of the phrase ‘war on terror’ was entirely inappropriate. As Eliza Manningham-Buller, the previous head of the Security Service (MI5), has said, this phrase afforded al-Qaeda the status of warriors, which they were not, and implied a war against a tactic – terrorism is a tactic not a state, organisation or ideology. The use of the phrase ‘war on terror’ also afforded Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda a legitimacy that they did not warrant. In his rush to speak language that would play well in the mid-west of the USA, he defined the forthcoming struggle with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as a war between ‘us and them’. He was very clear who the ‘us’ was, but never satisfactorily defined ‘them’ – so others did it for him. Very soon, the battle lines were described in apocryphal terms – a clash of civilisations, a clash of ideologies, modernisation versus medievalism and, although less so, a clash of religions. For Bush and his allies, the context was clear – you were either supportive or the enemy. Without careful definition, this language could always mean that those in the Muslim world were part of ‘them’ – in civilisation, ideological or religious terms. They were most profoundly not, but the perception was there nonetheless.
The language of the ‘war on terror’ allowed a whole range of grievances, whatever their relative merits, to be unified under al-Qaeda’s colours - from the Middle East Peace Process and the lack of progress for the Palestinian cause, through Kashmir, the Gulf, threats against Iran, Lebanon and the dictatorships in North Africa – Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. David Miliband is right to say that this was one of the negative consequences of describing events as a ‘war on terror’. The cause was not lost, but the early definition and use of this lexicography of war, stunted the ability of the West to stay on the front foot with the moral high ground.
The strength of the narrative of ‘core al-Qaeda’ (as Osama bin Laden’s central organisation was described) is its simplicity. It claimed to speak for the entire Muslim population of the world. It claimed to exist to right the wrongs and grievances of the Muslim world. It most emphatically did not, but there was a lack of confidence or unwillingness to say so in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Its worldview was couched in terms of the Muslim world versus the West and the ‘war on terror’ was easily painted as a war against Islam. Its violent brand of ‘Islamism’, rooted in the works of Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, amongst others, was not representative of the Muslim world, did not command mass support and was very distinct from a range of varying historic traditions of political Islam.
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda should have been taken on for the minority extremist force that they were – and not afforded any status at all. The Taliban government should have been taken on because they had shown by their actions to be key allies of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda – and not because they were a fundamentalist Muslim government. They had been such a government since emerging into power in 1994 after the civil war in Afghanistan – so why not attack them then? Equally, having defeated the Taliban and destroyed al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan, there does not seem to have been a clear vision of how to help Afghanistan develop its own future. When there were clear opportunities to establish a lasting peace in Afghanistan, as in 2002, including the more moderate elements of the Taliban, such talks did not happen and the moment passed with significant consequences.
Lessons might have been learnt from the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1989. The USA worked very closely with Pakistan, especially with the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to fund, organise and supply the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance – the Mujahideen. The Soviet Union was defeated and left in February 1989 and soon after, seeing its job as over, the USA disengaged from Afghanistan and left the other key players to it. This was a major mistake. Over the next ten to twelve years – all the way up to 2001 – Afghanistan was firstly divided by civil war and then subjected to the fundamentalist regime of the Taliban. It was never stable. Left to its own devices in the wake of the departure of the USA, Pakistan supported the Taliban after 1994 hoping that it would bring some stability and end the power of the warlords. The Taliban were, as we now know, far too extreme even for the ISI and eventually paid for its acquiescence to the development of the al-Qaeda base in the country.
A key lesson from this period is that after the defeat of the Soviet Union, the West walked away too soon. Currently we are scheduled to be out of Afghanistan by 2015, with no more combat roles after 2014. The plan is for the Afghanistan police and army to take control between now and then – and I hope that happens. But can we really afford to walk away from Afghanistan prematurely again – for the third time in around twenty years? Can we afford not to be talking to the more moderate elements of the Taliban? And will there be any further progress at all while Karzai is still in government, or do we have to wait until he goes?
If it is now appropriate to speak to the moderate elements of the Taliban to ensure a stable future for Afghanistan, then should we try to speak to al-Qaeda? Is this one of the key lessons of the last ten years since 9/11? Some have suggested so, particularly Eliza Manningham-Buller and Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s former Chief of Staff in Downing Street. I think the answer to them and others is a profound and very loud ‘no’ to any such dialogue with al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s ideology is, of necessity, universal and destructionist – it is fundamentally against all of us – including the overwhelming majority of Muslims who disagree with it. It seeks to destroy all who disagree with it.
To suggest dialogue on the basis that, as some have suggested, historically we have always spoken to terrorists in the end, is a suggestion rooted in a naïve ahistoricism. We have not always spoken to terrorists – history simply isn’t that neat. Yes it is true that we have spoken to some nationalist based terror groups rather than endure further violence. But groups such as the IRA had clear, limited political objectives – the more moderate elements of the Taliban may be seen in this light. But al-Qaeda is an organisation with a far more abstract ideology, not dissimilar to the nihilistic and violent ideologues of the Rote Armee Fraktion, the Red Army or Brigate Rosse – no-one realistically suggested in the 70s and 80s that these groups should be negotiated with at all. Politicians understood that you could not give the Brigate Rosse a little of the ‘Marxist-Leninist revolutionary state’ that they sought, anymore than you could give al-Qaeda the ‘caliphate’ for two or three days a week.
Ten years on from the murder and mayhem of 9/11 in New York, Shanksville and at the Pentagon, we must learn the lessons of the horrible day and from the mistakes that have been made since. The last decade has not been the decade of bin Laden or al-Qaeda, but neither has it been a decade of unalloyed success for freedom and democracy. Hopefully we have learnt that democracy is stronger when it remains faithful to its values. There can be no role for torture, rendition, Camp X-Ray or ill-thought out legislation in the future. Democracies should be robust in their self-defence, but a useful starting point might be, as Jens Stoltenberg said after the horrific murder of 68 people by a right-wing extremist, ‘to work for more democracy, openness and humanity, but without naivety’. Ten years on, we remember the dead, learn the lessons and can and should look to the future with an honesty amongst nations that allows us all to make the next ten years more successful for all. The most lasting memorial to the dead will be a world at peace, an end to terrorism and an increased respect for human rights and the international rule of law. The future can look bright – Brazil, Russia, India and China remain strong and are getting stronger – and the West needs to understand how it should engage with them more effectively as partners. The Arab Spring implies, at least, a greater degree of freedom for the nations of the Maghreb and, hopefully, elsewhere in the Arab world. Al-Qaeda is much diminished, but not dead and we need to understand how it will transform itself in the next decade, but the legacy of the dead should be the increasing irrelevance of al-Qaeda. There needs to be more progress on the Middle East peace process – it seems stalled at the moment. But we should make no mistake – even if all these apparent grievances are dealt with by the international community – al-Qaeda will find other reasons to kill, murder and maim. The overall legacy of 9/11 must be a continuing vigilance by all of those that al-Qaeda defines as its enemy – and that is all of us.
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